

(b)(6)

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
Administrative Appeals Office (AAO)
20 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., MS 2090
Washington, DC 20529-2090



**U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration
Services**

Date:

MAY 22 2013

Office: TEXAS SERVICE CENTER

FILE: [REDACTED]

IN RE:

Petitioner:

Beneficiary:

PETITION: Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker as a Member of the Professions Holding an Advanced Degree or an Alien of Exceptional Ability Pursuant to Section 203(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2)

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER:

INSTRUCTIONS:

Enclosed please find the decision of the Administrative Appeals Office in your case. All of the documents related to this matter have been returned to the office that originally decided your case. Please be advised that any further inquiry that you might have concerning your case must be made to that office.

If you believe the law was inappropriately applied by us in reaching our decision, or you have additional information that you wish to have considered, you may file a motion to reconsider or a motion to reopen. The specific requirements for filing such a request can be found at 8 C.F.R. § 103.5. All motions must be submitted to the office that originally decided your case by filing a Form I-290B, Notice of Appeal or Motion, with a fee of \$630. Please be aware that 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i) requires that any motion must be filed within 30 days of the decision that the motion seeks to reconsider or reopen.

Thank you,

Ron Rosenberg
Acting Chief, Administrative Appeals Office

DISCUSSION: The preference visa petition was denied by the Director, Texas Service Center, and is now before the Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) on appeal. The appeal will be dismissed.

The petitioner is a software development and computer consulting company. It seeks to employ the beneficiary permanently in the United States as a computer and information systems manager. As required by statute, the petition is accompanied by an ETA Form 9089, Application for Permanent Employment Certification, certified by the United States Department of Labor (DOL). The director determined that the petitioner had not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage beginning on the priority date of the visa petition. The director denied the petition accordingly.

The record shows that the appeal is properly filed, timely and makes a specific allegation of error in law or fact. The procedural history in this case is documented by the record and incorporated into the decision. Further elaboration of the procedural history will be made only as necessary.

As set forth in the director's October 15, 2012 denial, the primary issue in this case is whether the petitioner has the ability to pay the proffered wage as of the priority date and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence.

In pertinent part, section 203(b)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(b)(2), provides immigrant classification to members of the professions holding advanced degrees or their equivalent and whose services are sought by an employer in the United States. An advanced degree is a United States academic or professional degree or a foreign equivalent degree above the baccalaureate level. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(2). The regulation further provides:

A United States baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent degree followed by at least five years of progressive experience in the specialty shall be considered the equivalent of a master's degree. If a doctoral degree is customarily required by the specialty, the alien must have a United States doctorate or a foreign equivalent degree.

Id.

The regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2) states in pertinent part:

Ability of prospective employer to pay wage. Any petition filed by or for an employment-based immigrant which requires an offer of employment must be accompanied by evidence that the prospective United States employer has the ability to pay the proffered wage. The petitioner must demonstrate this ability at the time the priority date is established and continuing until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. Evidence of this ability shall be either in the form of copies of annual reports, federal tax returns, or audited financial statements. In a case where the prospective United States employer employs 100 or more workers, the director

may accept a statement from a financial officer of the organization which establishes the prospective employer's ability to pay the proffered wage.

The petitioner must demonstrate the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date, which is the date the ETA Form 9089 was accepted for processing by any office within the employment system of the DOL. *See 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(d)*. The petitioner must also demonstrate that, on the priority date, the beneficiary had the qualifications stated on its ETA Form 9089 as certified by the DOL and submitted with the instant petition. *Matter of Wing's Tea House*, 16 I&N Dec. 158 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977).

Here, the ETA Form 9089 was accepted on May 18, 2010. The proffered wage as stated on the ETA Form 9089 is \$161,013 per year.

The AAO conducts appellate review on a *de novo* basis. *See Soltane v. DOJ*, 381 F.3d 143, 145 (3d Cir. 2004). The AAO considers all pertinent evidence in the record, including new evidence properly submitted upon appeal.

The evidence in the record of proceeding shows that the petitioner is structured as an S corporation. On the Form I-140, Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker, the petitioner claimed to have been established in 2003 and to currently employ 100 workers. According to the tax returns in the record, the petitioner's fiscal year is based on a calendar year. On the ETA Form 9089, signed by the beneficiary on August 3, 2010, the beneficiary claimed to have worked for the petitioner from April 2003 through January 2012.

The petitioner must establish that its job offer to the beneficiary is a realistic one. Because the filing of an ETA Form 9089 establishes a priority date for any immigrant petition later based on the ETA Form 9089, the petitioner must establish that the job offer was realistic as of the priority date and that the offer remained realistic for each year thereafter, until the beneficiary obtains lawful permanent residence. The petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is an essential element in evaluating whether a job offer is realistic. *See Matter of Great Wall*, 16 I&N Dec. 142 (Acting Reg'l Comm'r 1977); *see also* 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). In evaluating whether a job offer is realistic, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) requires the petitioner to demonstrate financial resources sufficient to pay the beneficiary's proffered wages, although the totality of the circumstances affecting the petitioning business will be considered if the evidence warrants such consideration. *See Matter of Sonegawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612 (Reg'l Comm'r 1967).

Although the record contains a letter stating that the petitioner employs more than one hundred workers and has the ability to pay those workers, the letter is signed by [REDACTED] HR Manager, and not by a financial officer of the company as required by regulation at 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(g)(2). Therefore, the letter is of no probative value.

In determining the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage during a given period, USCIS will first examine whether the petitioner employed and paid the beneficiary during that period. If the petitioner establishes by documentary evidence that it employed the beneficiary at a salary equal to

or greater than the proffered wage, the evidence will be considered *prima facie* proof of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

The beneficiary's Form W-2 for 2011 shows compensation received from the petitioner as detailed in the table below.

| Year | Beneficiary's actual Compensation | Proffered wage | Wage increase needed to pay the proffered wage |
|------|-----------------------------------|----------------|--|
| 2011 | \$75,712.50 | \$161,013 | \$85,300.50 |

Here, the petitioner has established that it paid the beneficiary wages less than the full proffered wage. Therefore, the petitioner must establish that it can pay the difference between the wages actually paid to the beneficiary and the proffered wage for 2011.

If, as in this case, the petitioner has not established that it paid the beneficiary an amount at least equal to the proffered wage during the required period, USCIS will next examine the net income figure reflected on the petitioner's federal income tax return, without consideration of depreciation or other expenses. *River Street Donuts, LLC v. Napolitano*, 558 F.3d 111 (1st Cir. 2009); *Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d 873 (E.D. Mich. 2010), *aff'd*, No. 10-1517 (6th Cir. filed Nov. 10, 2011). Reliance on federal income tax returns as a basis for determining a petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage is well established by judicial precedent. *Elatos Restaurant Corp. v. Sava*, 632 F. Supp. 1049, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (*citing Tongatapu Woodcraft Hawaii, Ltd. v. Feldman*, 736 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1984)); *see also Chi-Feng Chang v. Thornburgh*, 719 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Texas 1989); *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); *Ubeda v. Palmer*, 539 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Ill. 1982), *aff'd*, 703 F.2d 571 (7th Cir. 1983). Reliance on the petitioner's gross receipts and wage expense is misplaced. Showing that the petitioner's gross receipts exceeded the proffered wage is insufficient. Similarly, showing that the petitioner paid wages in excess of the proffered wage is insufficient.

In *K.C.P. Food Co., Inc. v. Sava*, 623 F. Supp. at 1084, the court held that the Immigration and Naturalization Service, now USCIS, had properly relied on the petitioner's net income figure, as stated on the petitioner's corporate income tax returns, rather than the petitioner's gross income. The court specifically rejected the argument that USCIS should have considered income before expenses were paid rather than net income. *See Taco Especial v. Napolitano*, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 881 (gross profits overstate an employer's ability to pay because it ignores other necessary expenses).

With respect to depreciation, the court in *River Street Donuts* noted:

The AAO recognized that a depreciation deduction is a systematic allocation of the cost of a tangible long-term asset and does not represent a specific cash expenditure during the year claimed. Furthermore, the AAO indicated that the allocation of the depreciation of a long-term asset could be spread out over the years or concentrated into a few depending on the petitioner's choice of

accounting and depreciation methods. Nonetheless, the AAO explained that depreciation represents an actual cost of doing business, which could represent either the diminution in value of buildings and equipment or the accumulation of funds necessary to replace perishable equipment and buildings. Accordingly, the AAO stressed that even though amounts deducted for depreciation do not represent current use of cash, neither does it represent amounts available to pay wages.

We find that the AAO has a rational explanation for its policy of not adding depreciation back to net income. Namely, that the amount spent on a long term tangible asset is a "real" expense.

River Street Donuts at 118. “[USCIS] and judicial precedent support the use of tax returns and the *net income figures* in determining petitioner’s ability to pay. Plaintiffs’ argument that these figures should be revised by the court by adding back depreciation is without support.” *Chi-Feng Chang* at 537 (emphasis added).

The petitioner’s 2011 federal income tax return was the most recent return available.

That return shows the company’s net income as detailed in the table below.¹

| Year | Net Income |
|------|----------------------------------|
| 2011 | \$16,422 per line 18, Schedule K |

The petitioner has not established that it had sufficient net income to pay the full proffered wage for each of the relevant years. Therefore, USCIS will review the petitioner’s net current assets.

Net current assets are the difference between the petitioner’s current assets and current liabilities.² A corporation’s year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6. Its year-end

¹ Where an S corporation’s income is exclusively from a trade or business, USCIS considers net income to be the figure for ordinary income, shown on line 18 of page one of the petitioner’s IRS Form 1120S. However, where an S corporation has income, credits, deductions or other adjustments from sources other than a trade or business, they are reported on Schedule K. If the Schedule K has relevant entries for additional income, credits, deductions or other adjustments, net income is found on line 23 (2001-2003, line 17e (2004-2005), or line 18 (2006-2011) of Schedule K. See <http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/i1120s--2011.pdf> (accessed May 14, 2013) (indicating that Schedule K is a summary schedule of all shareholders’ shares of the corporation’s income, deductions, credits, etc.).

² According to *Barron’s Dictionary of Accounting Terms* 117 (3rd ed. 2000), “current assets” consist of items having (in most cases) a life of one year or less, such as cash, marketable securities, inventory and prepaid expenses. “Current liabilities” are obligations payable (in most cases) within one year, such accounts payable, short-term notes payable, and accrued expenses (such as taxes and

current liabilities are shown on lines 16 through 18. If the total of a corporation's end-of-year net current assets and the wages paid to the beneficiary (if any) are equal to or greater than the proffered wage, the petitioner is expected to be able to pay the proffered wage using those net current assets.

The petitioner's 2011 tax return demonstrates the company's end-of-year net current assets as shown in the following table.

| Year | Net Current Assets |
|------|--------------------|
| 2011 | -\$426,124 |

The petitioner's net current assets were insufficient to pay the difference between the wages actually paid to the beneficiary and the proffered wage in 2011.

On appeal, counsel states that "loans to shareholders," which appears on line 7 of schedule L of the Form 1120, should be treated as a net current asset. Therefore, counsel states, the petitioner had sufficient net current assets to pay the proffered wage in 2011. Counsel's reliance on the assets of the shareholders is not persuasive. As noted above, a corporation's year-end current assets are shown on Schedule L, lines 1 through 6. "Loans to shareholders," appearing on line 7 of Schedule L, is not included in the calculation of net current assets. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the "loans to shareholders" had a life of one year or less.

Since the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the beneficiary the proffered wage as of the priority date through an examination of wages paid to the beneficiary, or its net income or net current assets, USCIS may consider the overall magnitude of the petitioner's business activities in its determination of the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage. *See Matter of Sonegawa*, 12 I&N Dec. 612.

The petitioning entity in *Sonegawa* had been in business for over 11 years and routinely earned a gross annual income of about \$100,000. During the year in which the petition was filed in that case, the petitioner changed business locations and paid rent on both the old and new locations for five months. There were large moving costs and also a period of time when the petitioner was unable to do regular business. The Regional Commissioner determined that the petitioner's prospects for a resumption of successful business operations were well established. The petitioner was a fashion designer whose work had been featured in *Time* and *Look* magazines. Her clients included Miss Universe, movie actresses, and society matrons. The petitioner's clients had been included in the lists of the best-dressed California women. The petitioner lectured on fashion design at design and fashion shows throughout the United States and at colleges and universities in California. The Regional Commissioner's determination in *Sonegawa* was based in part on the petitioner's sound business reputation and outstanding reputation as a couturiere.

As in *Sonegawa*, USCIS may, at its discretion, consider evidence relevant to the petitioner's financial ability that falls outside of a petitioner's net income and net current assets. USCIS may consider such factors as the number of years the petitioner has been doing business, the established historical growth of the petitioner's business, the overall number of employees, the occurrence of any uncharacteristic business expenditures or losses, the petitioner's reputation within its industry, whether the beneficiary is replacing a former employee or an outsourced service, or any other evidence that USCIS deems relevant to the petitioner's ability to pay the proffered wage.

The AAO recognizes that the petitioner has been in business since 2003. Nevertheless, the evidence submitted does not reflect a pattern of significant growth or the occurrence of an uncharacteristic business expenditure or loss that would explain its inability to pay the proffered wage from the priority date. In addition, no evidence has been presented to show that the petitioner has a sound and outstanding business reputation as in *Sonegawa*. Unlike *Sonegawa*, the petitioner has not submitted any evidence reflecting the company's reputation or historical growth since its inception in 2003. Nor has it included any evidence or detailed explanation of the corporation's milestone achievements. Thus, assessing the totality of the circumstances in this individual case, it is concluded that the petitioner has not established that it had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage.

The evidence submitted does not establish that the petitioner had the continuing ability to pay the proffered wage beginning on the priority date.

Beyond the decision of the director, the petitioner has also failed to establish that the ETA Form 9089 requires a professional holding an advanced degree because the job offer portion of the ETA Form 9089 is not consistent with the minimum requirements for classification as a professional holding an advanced degree, and the appeal will be dismissed.

By way of background, the regulation at 20 C.F.R. § 656.17(h)(4)(ii) states:

If the alien beneficiary already is employed by the employer, and the alien does not meet the primary job requirements and only potentially qualifies for the job by virtue of the employer's alternative requirements, certification will be denied unless the application states that any suitable combination of education, training, or experience is acceptable.

This regulation was intended to incorporate the Board of Alien Labor Certification Appeals (BALCA) ruling in *Francis Kellogg*, 1994-INA-465 and 544, 1995-INA 68 (Feb. 2, 1998) (en banc), that "where the alien does not meet the primary job requirements, but only potentially qualifies for the job because the employer has chosen to list alternative job requirements, the employer's alternative requirements are unlawfully tailored to the alien's qualifications . . . unless the employer has indicated that applicants with any suitable combination of education, training or experience are acceptable." The statement that an employer will accept applicants with "any suitable combination of education, training or experience" is commonly referred to as "*Kellogg* language."

Previously, the DOL was denying application for permanent employment certification applications containing alternative requirements in Part H, Question 14, if the application did not contain the *Kellogg* language. However, two BALCA decisions have significantly weakened this requirement. In *Federal Insurance Co.*, 2008-PER-00037 (Feb. 20, 2009), BALCA held that the ETA Form 9089 failed to provide a reasonable means for an employer to include the *Kellogg* language on the application for permanent employment certification. Therefore, BALCA concluded that the denial of the application for permanent employment certification for failure to write the *Kellogg* language on the application for permanent employment certification application violated due process. Also, in *Matter of Agma Systems LLC*, 2009-PER-00132 (BALCA Aug. 6, 2009), BALCA held that the requirement to include *Kellogg* language did not apply when the alternative requirements were "substantially equivalent" to the primary requirements.

Given the history of the *Kellogg* language requirement at 20 C.F.R. § 656.17(h)(4)(ii), the AAO does not generally interpret this phrase when included as a response to Part H, Question 14, to mean that the employer would accept lesser qualifications than the stated primary and alternative requirements on the application for permanent employment certification. To do so would make the actual minimum requirements of the offered position impossible to discern, it would render largely meaningless the stated primary and alternative requirements of the offered position on the application for permanent employment certification, and it would potentially make any application for permanent employment certification with alternative requirements ineligible for classification as an advanced degree professional. In other words, the AAO does not consider the presence of *Kellogg* language in a application for permanent employment certification to have any material affect on the interpretation of the minimum requirements of the job.

Consequently, in this case, the *Kellogg* language cannot be used to elevate an alternative set of job requirements, which are facially less than a bachelor's degree plus five years of progressive experience, to a level at least equal to the minimum requirements of the advanced degree professional category. The petitioner inserted the *Kellogg* language in response to Question 8-B ("Any suitable combination of education, exp. or training is acceptable"). This language is interpreted to mean "any combination that is at least equal to or greater than the specific requirements on the form." However, the specific requirements articulated on the form are "other" educational requirements and 60 months of experience, which are less than the minimum requirements for the advanced degree professional category. Accordingly, the presence of the *Kellogg* language on line 8-B clarifies the alternate requirement of "other" education and 60 months of work experience. Such a combination does not meet the definition of a professional holding an advanced degree or the equivalent or of an alien of exceptional ability, and the appeal must be dismissed. 8 C.F.R. § 204.5(k)(4).

The burden of proof in these proceedings rests solely with the petitioner. Section 291 of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1361. The petitioner has not met that burden.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.